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Economic restructuring in the 1980s opened the doors to the previously state-
dominated television sector in developing countries. In India, unexpectedly, the
resulting competitive setting produced multiple channels targeting various local
ethnicities from below along with national-level expansion involving transna-
tional corporations from above in a process now known as localization. While the
plurality of channels translates into growth of the public sphere, this paper
examines the reasons behind the uneven growth of community media, which
cannot be explained by the community’s size or economic resources. Some
community channels extend their reach into the national arena while others lag in
media development implying unequal political participation in the communicative
system. What are the institutional reasons behind such variations in a multiethnic
setting? The paper also examines whether the development of ethnic media reﬂects
the redistribution of power taking place in the political arena or is it an
independent development with implications of its own.
Keywords: ethnic media; public sphere; political participation; community
television; India
The transformation of the media sector following the deregulation in the 1980s
produced a sense of apprehension regarding the expansion of transnational media
and its impact on to national political communication systems. As predicted by
scholars and business analysts, the 1990s saw an unprecedented media expansion of
transnational television into developed as well as underdeveloped parts of the world.
At the center of this expansion lies the question of will the new setting produce new
sources of information or will it marginalize communities with lesser resources who
represent local perspectives? After two decades of rapid changes, mergers and
alliances, it appears that the transformation produced varied consequences at
multiple levels. One of the most surprising developments is the growth of community
media along with the expansion of transnational corporations into spaces previously
dominated by the state. Local players from subnational communities presented by
new investment and technological innovations compete or associate with the
transnational media in markets at diﬀerent levels, including extranational ones. In
fact, the unexpected expansion of these local enterprises prompted transnational
media to produce localized programming, which constitutes a crucial element of the
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postindustrial processes. The focus of this study then, is upon the relatively neglected
subject of successful emergence of decentralized community-based television in a
previously centralized state-dominated sector and the consequential reshaping of the
communicative sphere. It addresses the question of what prevents some community
enterprises from participating successfully in the global and privatized communica-
tion space while other succeed causing access inequalities in the communicative
process. The unequal expansion then allows the transnational and other national
media to come into play in the community space.
A comparative study of community enterprises in the reorganized television
industry in India is at the center of this analysis. The term community here applies to
language-based ethnic groups. Census of India 2001 shows the existence of 122
languages in the country.1 Language-based political mobilization prompted reorgani-
zation of political boundaries in the early postcolonial era.2 Continued demands for
political authority over language community continue to shape political reorganization
in the country. Nor surprisingly, the growth of community television in India is also
primarily occurring along such ethnic markets. However, this growth is accompanied
by a variation, as some community media enterprises are successful while others falter.
Why do some communities have extensive media presence while others do not despite
the presence of a sizeable community? How did some poorer communities overcome
the shortage of resources whereas others with relatively richer or larger audience base
faced signiﬁcant diﬃculties? What community resources does a local enterprise
mobilize in a liberalized setting to establish competitive media institutions at the local
levels, which then contribute to the political dialog in the public realm as well as
advance community perspective into the national realm? Community media’s struggle
to establish themselves illustrates that the answer does not so much depend on
examining the economic wealth of a community as in the relationship among
community institutions that permit local media enterprises to advance into the national
as well as global setting. In addition, a study of variations in growth among community
media institutions contributes to the subject of where the resources for political
expression and communication come from in a less developed context.
Previous research on the subject of resources in the public realm mainly focuses
on commercial and state television in more developed systems. In commercial
systems prominent in USA and Australia, the resources were mostly from the private
sector. Not surprisingly, this dominance was subject to critical analysis, which
examined elite roles in shaping media messages and setting of the agenda.3
Meanwhile, prior to 1991, majority of television systems around the world were
dominated, if not outright controlled, by the state. The resource issues then were
clear; the resource came from the state, which then used the medium for its own
national purposes. Community media development in this setting heavily remained
external to the television sector, developing in areas such as ﬁlm, newspapers, and in
the 1980s, the video market which revolutionized how people consumed media
products and provided access to those who were left out of the media markets. Yet
due to the state’s control of the national television space, the local media in India
1http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement
1.htm (accessed on 31 May 2011).
2See Dasgupta, Language Conﬂict and National Development: Group Politics and National
Language Policy in India.
3See Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media. Also Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible.
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remained localized at the ethnic levels, to be occasionally promoted by the center
state as part of national integration projects. Rarely did local enterprises access
national or international audiences, because the central authorities controlled such
channels. National communication spaces were limited and unevenly available based
on priorities of central authorities. Therefore, a gap existed in understanding where
would the resources for private media development come from in a developing
economy context.
The broad acceptance of free market theory in the 1980s not only ideologically
but also technologically challenged the developing state’s exclusive control of its
audience as increasing amount of content came in from the skies. The competition
was in the form of multinational corporations as well as local enterprises. The shift
highlighted the lack of media analysis in the developing context where resource
channels were not so apparent. While the sources for multinationals are apparent,
where did the resources for community enterprises in this new setting come from?
This paper explores the development of community media enterprises in a less-
resourceful context in which the state remains one of the competing actors. Global
corporations with signiﬁcant resources are also present along with newly emerging
local players. The resource inequality reinforces concerns about the privatized global
media sphere consisting of multilevel enterprises. How do the smaller players
overcome their resource constraints in order to participate in the restructured
communicative space? What do local communities rely on for developing successful
media systems providing them with a voice in the national public sphere? In reverse,
why are some community media players comparatively not able to compete in the
globalizing setting even though they appear to contain the resources required to
advance as illustrated by the case of Punjab and West Bengal media here?
I suggest here that speciﬁc form of a cross-institutional relationship at the local
level not only provides material resources for the local media but also helps shape
consumption patterns and audience preferences at the community level. The success
of a competitive community media is linked to the strategic use of interinstitutional
linkages at the community level as shown by the two successful cases of Kerala and
Andhra Pradesh. Meanwhile, the lack of such relationships undermines attempts by
community enterprises to gain resources and form an audience base. Inequalities in
the public sphere then are shaped by community enterprise that has access to it
through their success as well as a vacuum created by those who are unable to
contribute in this space.
Media and the public sphere
Theoretical perspectives addressing the relationship between media and politics are
predominantly rooted in developed media systems. Yet, they provide some
normative objectives for media institutions in the developing context. For instance,
an example of a norm indicated in the well-acknowledged functions of media in a
democratic setting refers to media’s role as a communicative channel in the public
sphere.4 Important public sphere scholars argue that in a deliberative democracy,
various communication channels are essential elements that feed into the public
sphere necessary for setting agenda for institutions that address or resolve public
issues. The media plays an important role by transferring issues from private space
4For example, see Blumer and Gurevitch, The Crisis of Public Communication.
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into the public sphere as abstractions, an important prerequisite before civil and
political institutions can address them.5 Habermas, for example, describes the public
sphere as a social space that emerges when communicative action takes place among
members of a society.6 This social space serves as a basic link between the citizenry
and institutions seeking to address social and political issues. Several established
democratic constitutions that promote freedom for media institutions rely on such
normative objectives.
Meanwhile, the critical focus on commercial systems is also rooted in well-
developed media systems providing a framework for critical analysis of transnational
media corporations in the developing world. According to prominent critics such as
Herman and Chomsky, unregulated commercial media undermine an important
communicative structure necessary for facilitating dialog among mass publics.7
Some groups and individuals gain more access to media due to previously acquired
political inﬂuence, which attracts media attention.8 Furthermore, commercial
media’s responsiveness to the market demand includes focus on entertainment as
well as an attempt at cost reduction. The media enterprise, for instance, may not
pursue information critical for long-term political or social development; informa-
tion that may have higher cost of attainment, therefore undermining media’s role as
surveyors of sociopolitical environment. Habermas also acknowledges that
commercial aspects of media may create representational inequalities in the public
sphere by giving commercially viable news more importance. Transnational
commercial media enhance this problem by removing the communicative structure
from its local moorings and context, transnationalizing or undermining political
aspects of the communicative structures that the local publics rely on for
deliberation. The extensive replacement of the state-dominated media by the
commercial model during the transformation in the 1990s brings such arguments to
the forefront of discussion on media and politics.
However, in developing countries, liberalizing of the media sector presents a
dimension not addressed by theories rooted in advanced systems. While the
homogenizing aspects of the commercial model are adequately presented, the
fundamental question of where are the resources for establishing enterprises is not
addressed. In a globalized setting, the implications are that transnational media have
a distinct advantage since they have more resources. The rise of community media in
India highlights smaller community enterprises may compete successfully in a
globalized setting; reaching out of their own ethnic markets to national and global
audiences. Meanwhile, an identiﬁcation of the form of resources required allows us
to understand how some communities participate in the public sphere whereas others
remain at the margins despite the apparent resources available to them. For instance,
some community enterprises in the more resourceful communities in India, such as
Punjab, struggle to establish themselves. What then determines this inequality of
participation in the public space?
Historically, because of the nature of state-controlled media, the television sector
remained largely underdeveloped. The ﬁrst opportunity for development of private
television sector rose in the post-1991 era due to liberalizing policies adopted by the
5Ibid., 365–366; 374–375.
6See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 360–363.
7Chomsky and Herman. Manufacturing Consent, The Political Economy of the Mass Media.
8Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 375–376.
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state. While large language communities such as Hindi speakers, which consist of
over 500 million, attracted global and national resources due to sheer numerical size
of audience, some community systems with smaller populations also fared well due
to local investment and consumption. The argument presented here is based on a
comparison between four community television enterprises in India; two present
successful and rapid cases of expansion into the region and nationally, whereas the
other two struggled seeking resources as well as audience throughout the ﬁrst decade
of media revolution in the country. The diﬃculties faced by some community
channels to gather resources tended to exclude them from the restructuring of the
communicative networks initiated by privatizing policies. The public sphere, as a
result, indicates some imbalance as some communities remained underrepresented.
A major issue here is what facilitates or retards the mobilization and
development of resources in the public sphere in a multiethnic setting. The research
presented here indicates that institutions at the local level designed to promote
community enterprises also substantially encouraged community-oriented consump-
tion of ethnicity. While an examination of the community institutions oﬀers an
aspect of understanding the development of local media, so is an understanding of
consumption, which as Veblen and others have pointed out, is socially determined.9
Cultural products often become closely associated with a particular identity as part
of a larger political eﬀort to distinguish oneself from others. To use Bourdieu’s term,
consumer choices are selected to draw a ‘distinction’. It can be applied in
understanding the consumption of media products as well, since choice of
programming also frequently reﬂects assertion of identity in order to belong to a
group or to separate oneself from one.10
In India, language commonly serves as an identifying symbol, which forms ethnic
communities and guides various forms of consumption. Extensive literature traces its
persistent use in political mobilization in many regions during anticolonial and
national movements. After independence, such language movements became
institutionalized and promoters of cultural consumption along language line as
identity markers. However, some regions did not witness comparable intensity or
extension of language movements. Particularly, regions reﬂecting a high intensity of
religious rivalry in politics often divided language communities, as in Bengal and
Punjab that adversely aﬀected the community’s propensity to consume and invest in
cultural products. The divided audience present a smaller market than the actual size
that the language community implies.
During the early phase of media development in India, political movements
based on language loyalty frequently encouraged local media and cultural
consumption as part of conspicuous local identity assertion. After 1947, gradual
institutionalization of such symbols of solidarity determined by relative strength or
weakness of competing movements produced community-oriented consumers,
organized investment as well as state support for the local enterprise during the
liberalization phase. The presence of more committed audience in these solidarity
regions further helped gain support and funding for smaller enterprises, which were
then able to expand and participate in local and national public spaces which opened
up as the liberalization phase gained momentum.
9Veblen, The Theory of Leisure Class.
10Bourdieu, A Social Critique of Judgment of Taste, Translated by R. Nice.
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Conversely, the lack of cohesive community-centered consumers may translate
into relative failure for some channels as they are unable to gather audience
resources from within or without their community. Recent interjection of ﬁnances
from global players also has to work around these preferences as several cases of
relative weaker community media in India illustrate. This study deals with these
issues and reasons for relative success or failure of media in regional communities of
diﬀerential extension, intensity, as well as political activation of cultural solidarity. I
hope to demonstrate how new voices have appeared in previously limited television
sector making prudent use of supportive resources and why some have lagged
behind. This will also aid an understanding of the community’s capacity to
contribute to the eﬃcacy of the public sphere and democracy. However, as Iris
Marion Young’s work reminds us, democracy is not an all or nothing aﬀair, but a
matter of degrees. Not surprisingly, the level of contribution of a communicative
channel to the public sphere in diﬀerent regions may vary, yet the relative pace is
subject to change.11
Media transformation from below: development of community media in the age
of transnationals
Media transformation in the 1990s illustrates several broad trends hinting at the
possibility of regional homogenization as various local and transnational corpora-
tions adopt similar formats in programming and strategies to tap into local audience.
Yet, utilization of local themes, languages, and behavioral preferences, force
production at the local level preventing full-scale secondary market dumping and
programming exchange. Such important trends towards localization in program-
ming as well as operational conduct hint at a presence of domestic institutions and
conditions that shape entry of transnational media. As a consequence, the state and
local enterprise display a complex relationship with the transnational companies.
For instance, transnational operations in Asia divulge various degrees of
responsiveness to the state as illustrated by STAR TV’s voluntary adoption of rules
that guided Indian state television. In addition, both the MNCs, STAR and Sony,
operate in India using local production sources. An identiﬁcation of the various
domestic institutions that shape these localization decisions is essential for
understanding the political and social consequences of this transformation.
A few important research works delve into post-1991 media transformation. The
most relevant one is Shanti Kumar’s Gandhi Meets Primetime in which he argues
that media transformation in India challenges the state’s nation state-building
objectives. What forms the Indian community, he asks, when many new enterprises
are oﬀering their versions of national symbols? The importance of this work lies in
his identiﬁcation of multiple community voices along with the new transnational
ones at diﬀerent levels in the country. He argues that this multiplicity of sources at
diﬀerent levels now challenge the state’s previous monopoly over deﬁning what an
Indian is.12 The state, he suggests, utilized the medium to oﬀer national symbols that
were centrally deﬁned.
However, a careful examination of the state’s domination over television prior to
liberalization moves leads to a diﬀerent conclusion. From 1959 to 1991, the central
11Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 5.
12Kumar, Gandhi Meets Primetime, 1–3.
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government’s hegemony over the medium was without doubt complete. Yet, the
state did not make its oﬀerings of symbols of Indianess through the medium of
television. Several factors undermined its communicative abilities. For instance, lack
of programming combined with the limited technology meant that only few urban
areas received state’s messages. Although the state, the sole provider of television,
planned its channel, Doordarshan, as an instrument of social change and
development for the ﬁrst decade and a half, television remained accessible solely
to residents of Delhi and surrounding regions. In 1975, it was extended to other
urban areas such as Mumbai, Chennai and Calcutta, although the majority of
population lived in rural India. Ironically, the state’s focus on educational potential
of television meant that several of its programs were rural-oriented when majority of
the viewers were city dwellers.
Furthermore, the incremental growth of viewership in the 1980s due to gradual
spread of transmitters and lack of reception technology challenges the notion that
the state utilized this medium eﬀectively as a communicative vehicle for political
purposes prior to 1991. Until 1982, Doordarshan transmissions reached 26% of the
population. Yet, only 17 million people out of total population of approximately 600
million were television viewers. The restructuring plan launched in 1982 due to the
Asian Games took almost a decade to manifest itself. In 1984, when national
integrative programs such as Buniyaad and Hum Log were launched, only 8% of the
nation could view them because of lack of television sets. In 1987 and 1988, when
mythology serials Ramayan and Mahabharat were transmitted, Doordarshan’s
transmission had reached 75% of the country. Yet, the viewership was estimated to
be only 74 million out of 650 million population.13
If the state’s desire was to primarily target urban consumers, one may argue
that it was successful, yet, the focus on producing predominantly Hindi and
English programming furthered reception limitations by the fact that only 42% of
Indians are Hindi speakers and even fewer are ﬂuent in English. The rest identify
themselves as primary speakers of other languages.14 Television programming for
non-Hindi communities remained limited, despite the complaints lodged by local
leadership. The center’s restructuring of television along language lines only
occurred when the challenge of competition from the local and transnational
enterprises appeared in 1991. Meanwhile, state’s domination of the medium
prevented it from developing into a constructive communicative channel for civil
society use.
Interestingly, the underdevelopment of television pre-1991 did not prevent the
formation of community media in the country. Although television remained
limited, the press, which appeared in the preindependence phase, provided for
community expression and communication that contribute to the civil life.
Currently, over 5500 newspapers published in the country illustrate the extensive
development of the press sector making it the primary form of communication at the
local levels.15 Several of them are historically connected to local institutions and
elite, which meant that the competition between the center, the states and various
13India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Audience Research Unit, Doordarshan
1999, 2.
14India, Ministry of Human Aﬀairs, Census 1991, state proﬁles.
15National Readership Survey 2005, 5http://www.allindianewspapers.com/india-newspaper.
html4 (accessed 13 August 2007).
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communities often played out in the vernaculars.16 The current ﬁgures from
National Readership Survey (NRS) indicate a continued signiﬁcance of vernaculars
as the ﬁve of the 10 circulating newspapers in the country are regional papers.17
While, the language diversity of the press points to the community as an important
location for resources for media development in the country, inequalities in the press
sector also raise the same concerns about communicative networks.
The multivocality of the Indian communities is historically visible in the cinema
sector as well. While the state provided stringent guidelines for production, private
community cinema thrived in India providing a communicative space for the
regional communities. For instance, while Bollywood is famous for producing a
large number of Hindi ﬁlms, an average of 150 per year, comparable ﬁgures are
present in Telugu and Tamil ﬁlm sector, averaging about 160 ﬁlms a year.
Comparatively, Bengali and the Punjabi ﬁlm sector produce fewer ﬁlms, with an
average of 30 and 15 ﬁlms, respectively, again pointing to the variations in
development.18 In the 1980s, the video revolution brought this important
communicative space into people’s home bypassing the controls set up by the
central government, and in some parts of rural India bypassing the lack of
televisions. For instance, video vans took cinema and other productions into areas
where there were limited movie theaters and TV homes.19 Interestingly, the 1980s
also saw an increase in the number of ethnic political parties targeting local
communities. Video technology allowed the political leadership that sought to
increase its community support by reaching the rural masses to support them.20
While a full analysis of the impact of the video vans and political developments is
beyond the scope of this paper, previously existing variations in the community
media development beneﬁted communities with a thriving ﬁlm sector as they were
able to expand into their local communicative space, whereas those that lagged
behind were not. For instance, the community ﬁlm sectors that were thriving were
able to access audience into rural areas because of the already existing media
products and markets. In the current context, private television development also
beneﬁts by the presence of these resources and institutional connections. Initial
programming for community television has come from the preexisting ﬁlm sectors.
Television viewership is on a rapid increase in India making it an important
communication channel. Approximately, 43% of the country lives in television
owning household, a ﬁgure that is growing by about 4% a year. The increase in
audience numbers, however, does not reﬂect the uneven representation in television
development across communities, which is important for understanding access to the
local and national public sphere. A following comparison of television development
16Jeﬀrey, ‘Malayalam, Day-to-Day Social Life of the People’, Economic and Political Weekly
32, nos. 1 and 2 (4–11 January 1997), 18–21. Also ‘Telugu Press: Ingredients of Success and
Failure’, Economic and Political Weekly 32, no. 5 (1–7 Feb 1997), 192–195 and ‘Punjabi Press:
Subliminal Change’, Economic and Political Weekly 32, nos. 9 and 10 (1–7/8–14 March 1997),
443–445.
17National Readership Survey 2005, 5http://www.allindianewspapers.com/India-newspaper/
NRS-Top-10-dailies-UþR.html (accessed 13 August 2007).
18Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopedia of Indian Cinema, 33.
19Ninan, Through the Magic Window: Television Change in India, 145–146.
20Rudolph, ‘The Media and Cultural Politics’, Economic and Political Weekly, 27 (11 July
1992), 1490. Also see M. S. S. Pandian, The Image Trap; M G Ramachandran.
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in four language communities illustrates the institutional relationships that promote
or undermine the emergence of community television in the liberalizing phase.
Community associations and the expansion of local media: Kerala and Andhra Pradesh
Signiﬁcant qualitative and quantitative expansion of television in India started to
occur in 1993. The introduction of three private language channels, Asianet
(Malayalam), Sun TV (Tamil) in the south and Zee (Hindi) in the north, initiated the
transformative decade. The lowered cost of satellite-based transmitting technologies
at the global level combined with regional expertise and social and political
associations provided domestic enterprises with unexpected resources and advan-
tages with which they were able to launch community channels. Although national
resources such as satellite uplinking capacity were yet to be made available to the
private sector, new access to global technology and capital permitted transmissions
into previously restricted areas through foreign satellites. Within a decade of the
deregulatory moves, the Indian television sector consisted of 40–50 new players
aﬃliated with diversity of channels. Upon liberalizing, the challenge to the state’s
monopoly of television was expected from more resourceful external players.
Instead, the more signiﬁcant challenge came from local enterprises that compelled
the state and transnational players to localize their strategies in order to gain
audience.21
The emergence of Malayalam television in Kerala provides an example of such
rapid development of community channels aided by previously established linkages
between the community elite and the local government. In 1993, Sashi Kumar, a
former executive oﬃcer of the Press Trust of India, launched Asianet using a Russian
satellite, with initial funding from a Moscow-based Indian. Meanwhile, the
government of Kerala provided the initial infrastructure. In 1993, Kerala had yet
to develop a cable infrastructure unlike some other Indian states consisting of larger
urban areas. Asianet founders won the state government contract to establish the
cable system network utilizing preexisting telephone poles. By 1995, Asianet claimed
viewership of 14% of the state’s TV audiences, which translated into all of Kerala’s
cable and satellite homes establishing a competitive setting for the Malayali
audience. The relationship between the local entrepreneurs and the state produced a
community-oriented television rapidly shaping the market structure. Newer
Malayalam channels, such as Kairali TV, also illustrate the institutionalized
relationship between the state of Kerala and the media. When Mamooti, an actor,
established Kairali TV in 2002, the Communist Party members provided the initial
funding illustrating institutional nexus between media institutions and the political
elite in the state.22 Following the example set by the Communist Party, the Kerala
Congress party announced its decision to launch a Malayalam channel.23
The mutually beneﬁcial nexus between political institutions, the media and the
elite found in Kerala was established historically in the early parts of the twentieth
century. It emerged as a consequence of widespread social movements that appeared
in reaction to the British claim of superiority. These movements, in diﬀerent forms,
some as caste movements and others as religious, adopted distinct languages as
21Chatterjee, ‘Globalization and Television Development’.
22‘Kairali TV to set up Rs.300 mn headquarters’, Indo-Asian News Service, 25 September 2006.
23‘Inspired By Left, Cong to Launch 24-Hr News Channel’, Indian Express, 20 June 2007.
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diﬀerentiating symbols and transformed them into icons for collective mobilization
against the prevailing socio-political order. Their association with regional political
movements produced objectives that impressed upon its media institutions. For
instance, in Kerala, several of the cinema’s prominent personalities’ involvement in
the regional movements formed a link between the ﬁlm sector and political
associations. This relationship was later institutionalized as the new state formed in
1956 utilized its resources to encourage the Malayalam cinema sector. It ranks as the
fourth largest ﬁlm industry in the country despite the fact that it is not a high-income
state. Meanwhile, the Malayalam press and cinema developed into a critical
communicative channel helping the formation of subnational public community
sphere. Similarly, movements in Madras state, later Tamil Nadu and Andhra
Pradesh, led to an association between the state and the media elite. Currently, Tamil
and Telugu ﬁlm industry are the second and third largest in the country. The Hindi
ﬁlm industry in Mumbai provides the other corresponding ﬁgure.24
Such institutional relationships also worked to promote consumption of cultural
products along community lines, which is reﬂected in Malayali audience’s preference
for Malayalam channels. Early during the national formation phase, the manner in
which Hindi was promoted to replace English in postcolonial India raised concerns
of discriminative policies among several language communities producing wide-
spread opposition.25 As language aﬃnities remained resolute in confronting the
center’s attempt to unify a modern nation-state through homogenizing policies, the
community media institutions participated by supporting the community elite as well
as becoming cultural symbols whose consumption was critical for community
cohesion. The lack of interest in Hindi and English channels in the state aﬃrms such
consumption preferences. Table 1 at the end of this article illustrates Malayali
audiences overwhelming preferences for Malayalam channels over Hindi or English
channels.
Television development in the post-1991 phase in the Telugu community presents
a similar case of institutional support for community media at the local level. In
Andhra Pradesh, Eenadu newspaper group, owned by Ramaji Rao, a Telugu media
mogul, launched Eenadu TV (ETV) using external sources for transmitting into the
state in 1994. The proliberalization local political party, Telugu Desam Party (TDP),
supported his television venture. The relationship between Eenadu and the political
party was established at the time of the founding of the party in 1983 when an actor,
N. T. Rama Rao, (NTR) established the TDP to compete with Indira Gandhi’s
Congress Party in the state, Eenadu’s editors candidly endorsed his party. Although
NTR’s initial popularity derived from his acting career in Telugu ﬁlms, Eenadu
dailies played a signiﬁcant role in promoting his political career.26 They provided the
crucial space for discussing the role of national party versus a local party. The
diﬀusion of the video technology at this time also beneﬁted the ﬁlm and political
personality nexus in the southern parts of the country.
The relationship between the media enterprise and political party continued
through the 1990s. The state institutions controlled by TDP supported Eenadu by
providing it with advertising revenues or presenting awards and loans. When Eenadu
launched its television venture, ETV, the distinct pattern of media involvement in the
24Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopedia of Indian Cinema, 33.
25Dasgupta, Language Conﬂict and National Development, Chapter 2.
26Pandian, The Image Trap: M G Ramachandran in Films and Politics.
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Table 1. Audience share in Kerala (15þ age group).
Channels in Kerala
Number of total households: 6,595,206*




Surya TV, KTV, Kiran TV (Malayalam) 27%
English channels (STAR sports, Discovery, Cartoon Network,
Disney, BBC, NDTV, etc.)
10%
Cable regional (Malayalam) 6%
Private Hindi channels (STAR, Sony, Zee group of channels)** 5%
Non-Malayalam community channels including DD Regional
(mainly Tamil)**
4%
Kairali TV (Malayalam) 3.5%
Amrita TV (Malayalam) 2.5%
Malayalam Manorama (News) 2%
Other Malayalam channels** 1.5%
Doordarshan National (DD1, DD2, DD3, DD4) 1.5%
Doordarshan (Malayalam) 1%
Total 100%
Note: Data supplied by TAM Media Research, Mumbai, 2009. Figures are rounded oﬀ to the closest 0.5.
*Denotes cable and satellite households in the state. Source: Census of India, 2001. Doordarshan ﬁgures
do not include terrestrial reception since there are no rating systems for terrestrial reception. **Combined
ﬁgure for channels that attract less than 1% individually. ***The Others category is used by TAM Media
Research.
Table 2. Audience share in Andhra Pradesh (15þ age group).
Channels in Andhra Pradesh
Number of households: 16,849,857*
(% of cable and





Teja TV (Telugu) 9.5%
Cable Regional (Telugu) 9.5%




English channels (STAR sports, Discovery,
Cartoon Network, Disney, BBC.)
8%
TV5 and TV9 6%
Other private Telugu channel** 3%




Doordarshan National (DD1, DD2, DD3, DD4) 1%
Others*** 1%
Total 100%
Note: Data supplied by TAM Media Research, Mumbai, 2009. Figures are rounded oﬀ to the closest
0.5. *Denotes cable and satellite households in the state. Source: Census of India, 2001. Doordarshan
ﬁgures do not include terrestrial reception since there are no rating systems for terrestrial reception.
**Combined ﬁgure for channels that attract less than 1% individually. ***The Others category is used
by TAM.
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region’s socio-political activities was apparent. While the national administration
debated the extent of liberalization measures to take, the new TDP leader,
Chandrababu Naidu invited global capital to form partnerships with regional
businesses. The state’s openness allowed Eenadu executives to take advantage of the
availability of global resources and amenability of the state’s ruling party to new
technologies and capital. By 1994, several private community channels, operated by
an alliance between Indian businesses and external players, supported by provincial
governments, were transmitting into India targeting speciﬁc language communities.
In reverse, this allowed the language communities to access a restructured and
expanding public sphere. Such channels formed the ﬁrst layer of competition for the
center’s Doordarshan and the transnational media companies.
In order to access the audience in India’s various ethnic communities,
Doordarshan initiated its regional language program in 1993. Although the
decision-making remained centralized, currently under Prasar Bharati, an indepen-
dent board, the production moved to the regional level initiating the decentralization
processes. Its increased reliance on commercial funding compelled it to consider
audience preferences at regional levels. In Kerala, Asianet was launched in 1993;
Doordarshan Malayalam followed in the same year. In Andhra Pradesh, two private
Telugu channels, ETV (Eenadu) and Gemini TV were launched in 1995.
Doordarshan launched its Telugu channel also in 1995, successfully capturing
some of the audience at the regional level.
Doordarshan’s regional channels currently form the secondary layer of
competition. It is distributed terrestrially across the state as well as through the
cable and satellite systems, whereas the local private channels are mainly accessible
through satellite or cable systems. Private channels target consumer classes mainly
accessible through the cable or satellite systems in order to get advertising revenues.
However, Doordarshan regional channels do not necessarily provide national
symbols as the programming is produced locally in the regional Kendras. Currently,
Doordarshan claims 11 regional Kendras (production centers) that develop programs
in local language(s), out of which four are in the south.
Following Doordarshan’s regional response, the transnational media acted
accordingly, further enhancing the competition for ethnic audience at the local level.
STAR expanded into regions when it launched Television Aimed for Regional
Audience (TARA) into regions that had yet to develop local community enterprises.
However, STAR reduced its investment in TARA when the audience ratings
remained low. TARA Punjabi and TARA Marathi both closed their operations in
2005. TARA’s failure was not due to the lack of resources but rather in the lack of
institutional linkages at the local level, which promote community media and
cultural consumption in the south. In attempting to reach audience in untapped
ethnic markets, STAR TV opted to stay out of the developed southern markets.
Interestingly, shortage of audience at the local levels in untapped areas is due to the
lack of institutional linkages that promoted ethnic consumption.
In contrast to the success of Southern channels, local enterprises in Bengal and
Punjab illustrate a much slower pace of development. For instance, in both the
states, established language channels are either state-funded or are channels that
were funded by noncommunity players illustrating a lack of investment at the local
levels. In addition, success is deﬁned by lower audience ﬁgures than seen in the south
(see Tables 3 and 4). A comparative study reveals the presence of diﬀerent
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institutional relationship between the local media and the political and the social
institutions than the one found in the southern states. Such an association appears to
crucially shape how a community participates in a new communicative space, as
Bengali and Punjabi community television ventures struggle to survive.
Divided community, divided media
Development of Bengali and Punjabi television provides a contrasting example to
the southern channels that emerged to take advantage of resources provided by the
sector opening in 1991. Their unimpressive growth illustrates the importance of
promotion of language as a cultural symbol by the political movements that were
institutionalized. In West Bengal and Punjab, local television enterprises did not
appear until 1998 and upon appearing often faltered due to lack of funding and
audience. In 2008, the pace of development and audience response was still lesser
developed than seen in the southern states. In West Bengal, the slower response by
the audience and the lack of investment from local players to initiate Bengali
television enterprise illustrates the importance of the nature of early linkage that
Table 3. Audience share in West Bengal (15þ age group).
Channels in West Bengal
Number of total households: 15,715,915*
(% of cable and
satellite – 12% of
households)*
Zee TV Bangla, 24 Ghanta News 17%
STAR Ananda, STAR Jalsha 11%
Cable Regional (Bengali) 11%
ETV Bengali* 10%
STAR (Hindi channels) 9%
Zee TV (Hindi channels)* 8%
Colors (Hindi)* 4%
Other Hindi channels** 4%
Aakaash Bangla 3.5%
MAX (Hindi)* 3.5%
Other English channels (HBO, Discovery, Cartoon Network,
Disney, BBC)**
2.5%
Channel Eight Talkies (Bengali) 2%
Other Non-Bengali/Hindi community channels (Indian)** 2%
NDTV* 1.5%
Sony Entertainment (Hindi)* 1.5%
9X (Hindi) 1.5%
Doordarshan (Bengali) 1.5%
Other Bengali Channels** 1.5%
Sangeet Bangla 1%
Sahara One 1%




Note: Data supplied by TAM Media Research, Mumbai, 2009. Figures are rounded oﬀ to the closest 0.5.
*Denotes cable and satellite households in the state. Source: Census of India, 2001. Doordarshan ﬁgures
here do not include terrestrial reception since there are no rating systems for terrestrial reception.
**Combined ﬁgure for channels that attract less than 1% individually. ***The Others category is used by
TAM.
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occurred between the language promoting movements, media and other community
institutions. Similarly, in case of Punjab, the institutional relationship between the
elite and media was undermined by the two partitions that split the community
politically and, therefore, culturally. This narrowed community-oriented consump-
tion for Punjabi and ﬁnancial investment for language-associated commercial
ventures. These two cases challenge the notion that a market can be deﬁned by
wealth and audience numbers making the study of emergence of inequality in the
public sphere more complex.
Bengali media: institutional development through elite consumption
The Bengali community presents a unique market structure that shapes its media
ventures. Although the subregion contains the initial requirements for the
development of the media sector, the consumption and production patterns, which
provide the foundation for media enterprises are distinctive from the ones found in
the southern cases. Bengali speakers present a large number of audience; over 90
million Indians are Bengalis; the neighboring Bangladesh also provides an additional
Table 4. Audience share in Punjab (15þ age group).
Channels in Punjab
Number of total households: 4,265,156*
(% of cable and
satellite – 23% of
households)*
STAR channels (Hindi) 17%
Zee TV channels (Hindi) 17%
Cable Regional (Hindi) 12%
Colors (Hindi) 8.5%
Other Hindi channels** 6%
PTC Punjabi, PTC News, PTC Chakde 5%
MAX (Hindi) 4%




Doordarshan National (DD1, DD2, DD3, DD4) 3%
Sahara One 2.5%
Sony Entertainment (Hindi) 2.5%
9X (Hindi) 2%
Channel Siti (Hindi) 2%
India TV (Hindi) 2%





Other Punjabi channels** 1%
Other Non-Punjabi/Hindi community channels (Indian)** 1%
Others*** 2%
Total 100%
Note: Data supplied by TAM Media Research, Mumbai, 2009. Figures are rounded oﬀ to the closest 0.5.
*Denotes cable and satellite households in the state. Source: Census of India, 2001. Doordarshan ﬁgures
here do not include terrestrial reception since there are no rating systems for terrestrial reception.
**Combined ﬁgure for channels that attract less than 1% individually. ***The Others category is used by
TAM.
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135 million making Bengali community a signiﬁcant market for any media
enterprise. In addition, Bengali ﬁlm sector’s historically important participation in
the country’s media also claims a foundation for the expansion of the television
sector. Some of the earliest developments of ﬁlm production houses in India were in
Bengal and Bengali participation in Mumbai ﬁlm sector is well-known.
Yet, Bengali channels did not appear until 1999. Also interesting was the
involvement of local enterprises backed by the state in the case of the southern
channels while the ﬁrst Bengali channel, TARA, was a subsidiary of STAR TV. The
Bengali language channel came as a broader attempt by STAR to launch local
language channels after ﬁve years of targeting English speaking audience in India. In
1991, STAR also launched a Hindi channel, STAR Plus, which has since seen a high
success rate. Meanwhile, TARA Bengali faltered despite coordination between the
multinational corporation and high level of local expertise. For instance, TARA’s
management was led by highly experienced Rathikant Basu. Before joining STAR, he
held the position of director general at Doordarshan. In 2005, STAR made another
attempt at the Bengali market with the launching STARAnanda, a joint venture with
Ananda Bazar Patrika, a historically important newspaper in Calcutta. In 2008,
STAR launched STAR Jalsha, an entertainment Bengali channel. STAR Jalsha and
STAR Ananda, at the time of the writing, held a three-month average rating of 9%
and 2%, respectively, of the cable and satellite audience (See Table 3). The most
popular channels were of the Zee group, Zee Bangla and 24 Ghanta News with the
average ratings of 12%. The Zee Entertainment group is a north Indian media house.
While these channels are hailed as successes, the lackluster audience response
illustrates a deeper issue. What is behind this slow growth of Bengali channels?
Bengali television’s record cannot be easily explained by lack of experience or
lack of resources. Several trends stand out. First, a shortage of previously existing
entertainment-oriented ﬁlm programming undermines the development of commu-
nity television; new channels producing new content require more funds.
Historically, the Bengali ﬁlm production numbers are lower than the southern and
Hindi channels that rely on their ﬁlm industries for material. This is surprising since
the history of ﬁlm in the subcontinent has strong roots in Bengal. In the 1930s,
Bengal took the lead in ﬁlm development in the country. However, the numbers
began to decline after the 1950s. More recently, in the 1980s and 1990s Bengali ﬁlm
sector produced an average of 35 ﬁlms per year; comparatively, Telugu sector
produced an average of 165 ﬁlms; the Malayalam industry produced approximately
an average of 80 ﬁlms and Bollywood produced an average of 170.27
While West Bengal maintains a well-recognized ﬁlm sector, the nature of the
ﬁlms also tells a unique story. Bengali ﬁlm sector’s target audiences appear to be the
educated middle class. The themes tend to discount commercialism and mass
sentiment. While Bengali ﬁlm industry boasts the presence of arts-oriented directors
such as Satyajit Ray, Rithik Ghatak and Mrinal Sen who refused to make ﬁlms with
a commercial appeal, others such as Tapan Sinha or Rituparno Ghosh’s ﬁlms also
target audience from the educated classes.28 While other regions also claim directors
who discount commercialism; what stands out is the shortage of mass-appeal ﬁlms in
the community. Historically, themes based on social and political issues are central
to many ﬁlms. Unlike ﬁlms in Bollywood and southern ﬁlm industry that sought out
27Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopedia of Indian Cinema, 33.
28Cunha, (ed.), The New Generation, 1960-1980, 156–157.
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mass audience by focusing on subject such as religious mythology and entertaining
action-related themes, in Bengal the themes remained mainly addressed to urban
middle-class sensibilities.
The neglect of what the masses may be seeking is a symptom of the nature of
the nexus that appeared between the community’s media and political groups early
on during the formation of region’s political institutions. The institutional
connection, which is apparent in the south where the language and media
institutions became part of the mass political mobilization against the central
hegemony, is not apparent in Bengal. In the two earlier cases, the political elite
mobilized language identity in order to secure their positions, which was later
institutionalized and gradually became part of the cultural promotion by the state.
The use of language to mobilize masses by the ruling elite produced politically
conscious consumers at a large scale. To consume language products such as the
community media in the south was part of identifying expression. Recent protests
surrounding the buy-out overtures by Times of India towards Matrabhumi and
those concerning STAR’s bid to buy Asianet is an example of ongoing use of the
local media as identifying expression. The two media groups are seen as community
institutions.
In contrast, in Bengal, while the language was important for identity, it did not
become part of mass political mobilization. Historically, the progressive groups that
took a stance against the center relied upon the symbol of social and economic issues
rather than language to mobilize the public. In addition, those who did not take a
stance against the center, part of the regional unit of the Indian National Congress,
relied upon nationalism and critique of radical ideology rather than community
symbols to mobilize the population. The Bengali language remained a part of the
elite cultural circles inﬂuencing the norms of production and promotion of language-
oriented media products in the region. The intended audiences for the new cultural
products were not the lower class consumers but urban-based elite ruling class which
inherited the legacy of Bengali renaissance. For instance, according to Jeﬀrey,
Bengali language newspapers developed rapidly at the turn of the century, however
they remained tied to the audience in Calcutta and this remained the case after
independence as well as more than half of their readers were situated in Calcutta
whereas over 85% of the Bengalis live in rural areas.29 The Bengali media
institutionally did not develop into a communicative space for the masses, limiting its
consumption in the community.
The media in Bengal was also aﬀected by the lack of investment. Sinha argued
that the prominent presence of the left is not the primary cause for lack of capital in
West Bengal; instead their dominance illustrates the presence of recipient
population. According to her, such policy comes from the nature of this dominant
class, which focuses on investments such as land. Partha Chatterjee points to the
emergence of this class in the nineteenth century that had no capital ventures to
invest in due to the decapitalization process that was a result of the British rule. The
new ruling class, which emerged as a byproduct of colonization, placed their money
into land, lived oﬀ the revenues and were centered mainly around Calcutta.30 This
29Jeﬀrey, ‘Bengali Professional, Somewhat Conservative and Calcuttan’.
30Sinha, The Regional Roots of Development Politics in India, 184–186. Also see Chatterjee,
‘Bengal: the Rise and Growth of Nationality’, 67–82.
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class became the target audience for the state’s political and media institutions
shaping its development.
Meanwhile, Kohli argues that one of the problems with the shortage of
investment in Bengal is the post-1947 phase is that the moneyed classes in Bengal
were nonethnic. The rise of left politics caused them to ﬂee West Bengal.31 While
this helps explain the shortage of initial investment available from within the
community for cultural ventures, the funding of TARA by STAR in 1999 and
Eenadu in ETV Bangla illustrates that investment need not be ethnic. Yet, the
lack of local capital for such ventures historically does contribute to lower rates
of mass media development aﬀecting the development of the commercial
television that heavily relies on previously existing sector and relies on mass
consumption.
Punjabi media: institutional underdevelopment in a divided community
Media development in India’s Punjabi community also presents a diﬃcult market
structure for ventures seeking community audience. Although the state of Punjab
in India consists of only 2% of the Indian population, the Punjabi Diaspora spread
across North India and a signiﬁcantly more 70 million Punjabis in the neighboring
Pakistan, augment the language market.32 In addition, Punjab is the second
wealthiest state in the country.33 In comparison, Andhra Pradesh is a midlevel
economy and Kerala is considered a low-ranking economy. Yet, despite the
apparent beneﬁt of such a market, a signiﬁcant Punjabi channel has not emerged in
the liberalized media setting. Doordarshan did not launch a Punjabi language
Kendra until 1998. The center felt no compulsion in launching a Punjabi channel
earlier as the competition for the audience was low. In 1999, Punjabi TV, the ﬁrst
local enterprise entered the foray but closed its doors within a year. In 2000,
TARA Punjabi, ETC Punjabi and Alpha Punjabi (a Zee TV division) also
launched their operations into Punjab. However, TARA Punjabi failed to capture
any signiﬁcant audience share due to slow development in programming forcing
the closure of the channel by 2004. Meanwhile, Alpha Punjabi and ETC Punjabi
both owned partially by Zee, sustain themselves. However, their funding
sources are external to the community. The audience share for these channels
remains low (See Table 4), which is essential for a participatory communicative
channel.
Slower progression of Punjabi language television does not necessarily reﬂect
Punjabi audiences’ lack of interest in Punjabi or the media. For instance, 1991 census
illustrates that 92% of Punjab residents consider themselves to be Punjabi speakers.
Doordarshan Punjabi claimed attention of 18% of Punjabi audiences in 2004. Nor is
it a reﬂection of the state’s economy. The cable penetration rate of 35% is the highest
31Kohli, ‘From Elite Activism to Democratic Consolidation: The Rise of Reform Communism
in West Bengal’.
32Wright, The New York Times Almanac, 2006.
33Punjab ranked third highest in the country per capita net state domestic product at
Rs.23,040 for the year 2005–2006; a ﬁgure which does not include Chandigarh (the shared
capital) which has one of the highest rates in the country. Punjab has maintained a high
ranking in the previous two decades. India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2006–2007,
Table 1.8, A–13.
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in the northern parts of the country and television homes at 82% is the highest in the
nation.34
The answer to this puzzle lies in the development of media institutions and
audience preferences in the community. In the two successful cases, the presence of
community political and social institutions that encouraged production of cultural
goods and advocated consumption along community lines provided a critical
supportive role for the local media. In return, these institutions gained a
communication channel, which augmented their community sense of unity and
autonomy. Whereas, such an alignment did not replicate itself in the Punjabi
community it led to a faltered pace of media development. For instance, Punjab’s
underdeveloped ﬁlm sector, which produces drastically fewer ﬁlms than the southern
states, is not able to provide the supporting role for television development.
Meanwhile, Punjabis in India read their news in three diﬀerent languages including
English, and Pakistani Punjabis appear to prefer Urdu and English undercutting the
cohesive communicative channels essential for a community public sphere.
Historically, the presence of three language movements in colonial Punjab, each
associated with the politico-religious movement, produced a divided media
institutions that did not encourage collaboration between the Punjabi community’s
religiously diverse social and political elite. This undermined the development of
consumers of Punjabi products, and also the underdevelopment of Punjabi cultural
industry which required elite investors. As part of the historical democratization and
social reform processes, Punjabi Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs sought to diﬀerentiate
themselves through the use of religious symbols. Primary language associated with
those religions became secondary symbols for the community. For instance, Urdu
became a political symbol for Punjabi Muslims as they associated themselves with
the elite culture of precolonial Mughal administration. Meanwhile, the Hindu
reform movements seeking cultural symbols chose Hindi in order to diﬀerentiate
themselves. Consequently, large segments of Punjabi speaking Hindus and Muslims
turned away from their mother tongue in order to rally behind Hindi and Urdu,
leaving few resources for the promotion of Punjabi or its cultural industries.
In the postindependence phase, this linkage between the region’s political and
religious organizations continued. The Punjabi religious communities developed
their exclusive media after the partition reﬂecting their political language preferences
and, thus, dividing up resources and audiences in the process. The history of Punjabi
press reveals the consequences of a social and political competition between the three
religious communities.35 Urdu’s previous status meant that many Muslim, Hindu
and Sikh elite were educated in the language. Punjabi, on the other hand, was the
language of home for these communities, marketplace and for Sikh religious
activities. As a result, Punjab’s press was predominantly Urdu or English avoiding
the major vernacular. Promotion of Punjabi was the limited domain of some
scholars and the Sikh religious community.
The status of Punjabi changed in 1966 after the region was restructured along
language lines. The new state instituted an educational system promoting Punjabi and
encouraging literary societies and programs that were also assisted by central policy of
34India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Audience Research Unit, Doordarshan
1999.
35Jeﬀrey, ‘Punjabi Press: Subliminal Change’.
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supporting regional languages. Consequently, Punjabi press did not emerge till the 1960s.
In the newly structured state, Ajit, initially established as an Urdu newspaper in the
preindependence Punjab, transformed into a Punjabi paper. Its founder expected an
increase in Punjabi readership due to the change in the educational system. His
motivations were also political. The paper supported the Sikh community politically
and socially. After Operation Blue Star in 1984 in which Indira Gandhi sent troops into
theGoldenTemple to drive out Sikh extremists,Ajit spoke out bitterly against the central
government’s actions. Throughout the 1980s and in the early part of 1990s, the paper
remained sympathetic towards Sikh separatism.36 After 1999, the paper adopted a more
moderate stance. However, the vernacular’s history since 1960s gives it an exclusive Sikh
community stance keeping away Punjabi Hindu readers and investors.
In addition, the continued presence of Hindi advocates after the redivision of
Punjab is also reﬂected in Punjab’s media development. Despite the restructuring of
Punjab into primarily a Punjabi-speaking area, the state continues to accommodate
one of the largest circulating Hindi vernaculars in the country. The Punjab Kesari,
launched by the Hind Samachar group, boasts of the third largest circulation among
the vernacular newspapers in the country with a circulation of over 700,000 daily. In
Punjab, this paper is associated with the Hindu business community. In 1980s,
Punjab Kesari openly opposed Sikh extremism. Consequently, the paper’s editor-
owners paid a heavy price. Its founder and his son were both assassinated by Sikh
extremists. Such direct nexus between media organizations and the tense politics of
Punjab aﬀects the investment in media and divides its audience around sectarian
lines. In contrast, the Malayalam language movement in Kerala, a state also
consisting of a religiously diverse population, was able to provide a unifying symbol,
whereas the Punjabi language became a secondary symbol for majority of Punjabi
speakers due to political competition among the three religious communities.
The Punjabi ﬁlm industry illustrates the consequence of a divided Punjabi
community. After the partition, several prominent actors and directors migrated
from a thriving Punjabi ﬁlm industry to Mumbai to the rapidly developing Hindi
ﬁlm industry. The result was the transfer of capital and expertise from Punjab. This
created a vacuum in the Punjabi cinema, adversely inﬂuencing media development
for many years thereafter. Not surprisingly, Punjabi media lags behind their
southern counterparts despite the high consumer propensity in the region.
Comparatively, it produces less than sixth of the ﬁlms produced in Kerala.37
In modern day Punjab, religious and language politics continue to rear their heads
inﬂuencing the region’s social and political institutions as well as cultural
consumption. Initial media enterprises such as Punjabi TV struggled to survive due
to shortage of investment capital. The two successful Punjabi channels in the state,
ETC Punjabi and Zee Punjabi survive through investment from external sources.
Neither of the primary investors in the two channels is from the state. Hindi television
also forms considerable competition for Punjabi channels. Many Punjabis continue
to be educated in Hindi along with Punjabi. Channels such as Zee TV, Sony and
STAR Plus operate successfully in the region, whereas in the southern states, their
presence is negligible. Members of the older generation that were educated in Urdu
are also ﬂuent in Hindi, as the two languages are verbally similar. Close proximity to
36Ibid.
37Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopedia of Indian Cinema, 33.
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the Pakistani border delivers Pakistani TV (in Urdu) to many Punjabi homes.
Although, the census illustrates an increase in the number of people identifying
themselves as Punjabi speakers in the state, the religious divisions and historical
experiences keep alive Hindi and Urdu as secondary languages in the region. The
presence of multiple competing, divided public spheres continue to impede the
development of local Punjabi channel by inﬂuencing investors and consumer choices.
Representing the community: shaping national communication from below
Two important conclusions regarding the television sector and the public sphere
emerge from studying these variations in the development of community television.
First, where the media and community associations were historically aligned, the
new media setting provided opportunities for the rapid development of new channels
of communication for the community. Thus the pattern of media development is
more complicated than the expected hegemony by more resourceful global
corporations. In addition, the community enterprises also challenged the central
government’s domination over television from below. The lineage of a cooperative
relationship between the media and community associations provided the resources
and the audience the local media enterprises needed to expand. The development of
community television, as noted, can be utilized for further strengthening of
community associations. Public sector television’s decentralizing moves following
the pattern established by the private television sector also enhanced this factor.
Local media enterprises from below provide a new platform for expression and a
new route into the discourse of the public sphere. However, inequalities remain at
the local level as marginalized members within a community may not have the
opportunity to participate in the new channel. The implication of the changed
communication structure for the nonelite groups is a subject for further study.
The new setting does allow smaller communities to have access to other
communities and national communicative spaces. The expansion of successful local
channels is not limited solely to their communities or their Diaspora but more
signiﬁcantly, it also includes noncommunity national audience. Local associations at
the regional origin translate into country-wide expansion of political messages as
well as an opportunity for cross-regional associations. Telugu ETV’s national
extension illustrates this point well. Eenadu, in addition, to local Telugu channel also
operates Bengali, Gujarati and Urdu channels. These channels tap into national
audience through the community route. The channel’s political associations have
national implications. For instance, ETV promoted TDM participated in the
previous central administration as a member of a coalition led by BJP (Bhartiya
Janta Party). A channel promoting the party in the community may also extend its
promotion of the coalition to other regions where it operates. The development of
such a network that permits new voices into the national sphere through the
community route has national implications.
In the slower cases of growth, lack of participation in this new communication
space may also produce new form of marginalization. Punjabi community’s religious
divisions may continue to undermine the new media enterprises in the state
preventing their expansion at the national level and their participation in the new
communication space. For instance, a successful Punjabi channel may focus on
entertainment rather than social or political issues that are divisive. Such an
enterprise would be unable to participate constructively in a deliberative democratic
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setting. Similarly, Bengali television’s lackluster audience response may translate
into the community’s inability to participate in the expanding public sphere.
The development of the new television system then implies activation of new
voices from below that reach national communicative spaces and at the same time
marginalization of others. The new voices oﬀer valuable resources for the
development of the expanding public spaces in the regional communities and their
national extension. The cooperative responses from the private and public sources,
as noted before, oﬀer channels of connection between popular groups and centers of
power in regions and the nation in ways that advance the range and the depth of the
public spheres. They also reveal the distance that the discourse has to cover in order
to deepen the range of popular inclusion by incorporating issues, interests, objectives
and cultural orientations of disadvantaged groups and areas. Media reorganization
in India, seen in context of the relative success in institutional collaboration in
politics and business, may perform a crucial facilitating role in promoting
inclusionary communication and democratic development. Multiple levels of public
sphere and interregional participation make for an interesting addition to theories of
democratic development in multicultural contexts. The rigid idea of a single
generalized public sphere may not agree with a culturally heterogeneous democracy
either.38 For a country like India, the idea of collaborative cross-regional public
spheres may agree more with the logic of diﬀerence-based democracy.
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